

Q. 1276

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 Jan 44January 6th, 1944.

(at 11.00 a.m.)

Went to my office at 10:00 a.m. and had a talk with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA concerning the fate of Germany and measures we must take thereafter regarding the situation, and asked him to investigate the subject.

I am wondering during the beginning of this year about the progress of the war during the coming year. No matter what is said, the fate of our ally, Germany, is the most important problem. If she has reserve power great enough to fight through the year and to assume the initiative, it will relieve the situation but if, on the contrary, she should be defeated during the coming year, it will be critical for our country. Although I am not wishing for such a thing to occur, it is necessary to prepare for that emergency.

First, we must consider whether we should take measures to bring the war to an end, in case Germany is beaten or surrenders unconditionally. In that case Japan should, of course, take action based on decisions independently arrived at relating to the situation at the time. It is reasonable to suppose that the enemy will intensify their political offensives on us. Therefore, we must take greatest care to devise counter policies lest traitors like Badoglio make their appearance in large numbers even within the country.

The continuance of TOJO's Cabinet will no doubt become quite difficult in such an event and upon its retirement, the big problem will be whether the mere recommendation of a successor to the Throne through the elder statesmen's council as usual, will be enough or not. If things get to such a pass it is a problem worthy of investigation whether or not the council should further determine beforehand an outline of the diplomatic course Japan should follow and recommend the succeeding cabinet to undertake the execution of the policy.

Secondly, under such a situation, I believe that there will be no hope in setting up such a plan unless it includes very considerable concessions on our part. As is clear in the Imperial proclamation of war the aim of the Greater East Asia War from the beginning was the breaking down of the so-called encirclement by the ABCD. We can regard it as a conclusion for the time being if this object is accomplished. From that point of view, it is possible to outline the plan as follows:

1. The problems of the Pacific Ocean shall be dealt with by the principal nations bordering that Ocean.

2. Japan, U.S.S.R., China, U.S.A. and Great Britain shall organise a commission.

3. The regions occupied by Japan and the islands in the Pacific Ocean shall be a non-fortified zone.

4. With the exception of Manchuria, the independent nations other than the principal nations in those regions, shall be made permanent neutral countries similar to Switzerland. The remaining occupied regions shall be placed under the administration of a joint commission composed of the principal nations.

5. The economic policies in the regions should, in principle, be based on freedom, reciprocity and equal opportunity.

When and how the plan is to be proposed is a matter which should be studied most carefully. The time should not coincide with the collapse of Germany but should be prior to the time when U.S.A., Great Britain and U.S.S.R. unite in their hostility against Japan. Measures may be taken with the U.S.S.R. as the go-between.

The plan may at a glance be considered as too conciliatory and weak-kneed, but looking over the future trend of the world, I believe we must nurture and cultivate our actual powers within the state for about one century to come, due to the experience gained as a result of the China Incident and the German-Soviet war to the development of aircraft, and to the actual strength of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. and moreover in view of the terrible attrition of our national power.

If this judgment is correct; we should carefully avoid being isolated and attacked all at once by the nations of the world as a coloured race, and from this point of view, I believe the best way for us is to maintain cooperation against Anglo-Saxon America and Britain with Soviet Russia and China which are essentially oriental, prepare our organization to meet the changing circumstances, and quietly save our real strength.



Ex. # 1277

Doc. No. 1632W (106)

Page 1

Entry for 17 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

17 July (Monday) clear

At 12.20 A.M. Premier TOJO came to my house and explained the Cabinet policy as is given in the separate paper. I acknowledged it.

At 8 Mr. HIROSE called, and I listened to information from all quarters.

Received in audience from 9.40 to 10.20. I reported to the Throne on the policy which Premier TOJO talked about.

At 10.30 Minister of State, KISHI, came to the office. He told me that he had been requested to resign by Premier TOJO, and he asked me for advice as to deciding how he should move. He said that he had come to me for talk advice after obtaining the Premier's consent. At 11.30, as is Chief of the Imperial Guards, NAKAMURA came to the office. At 2 o'clock, Premier TOJO came to the office after his given in the audience with the Emperor. Talked to me about appointing General UMEZU as Chief of the Army General Staff. rate  
paper.

Received in audience from 2.40 to 2.50. Went to the official residence at 3 o'clock, and had a talk with Mr. HIROSE and with Prince KONOYE at 4. Came home late in the afternoon. Received "SEITAIJITSU" /T.N. Type of physical culture remedy./ from Mr. TAKAHASHI. At 8, WADA came. Had a talk with him. Admiral OKADA came at 9.30.

At 9.30 P.M. on 17 July, 1944, Admiral Koisuke OKADA called and talked to me as follows:

1. A Senior Statesmen's council was held at Baron HIRANUMA's house today.

1. Those who attended were Messrs. WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, ABE, KONOYE and YONAI.

1. Mr. WAKATSUKI is made chairman, and he begins to talk first. This Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public; and he thinks that the present situation is really serious. He asks for opinions.

1. YONAI: The matter /T.N. portion illegible/ has been under discussion since the 13th, and after careful

consideration, I have written declining the offer. As OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau came and talked to me about the general opinion of the Navy and all, I replied that it would be reasonable for me to be returned to active service again and serve as Supreme War Councillor or in any other capacity; but that even if I entered the Cabinet as Minister of State I could be of little service, and that it would not be the thing to do. I have no intention of joining the Cabinet.

ABE: Although the people are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinet, the situation would become more difficult if it were replaced by a still weaker Cabinet. We must think about such points. As President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, I must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

HIRANUMA: Whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next Cabinet will be a weak one or not is not the point. The point is that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something.

HIROTA: I also was asked to help by KARASAWA who talked about diplomatic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union, but no one has talked to me since then. Even if I were asked to, I should not join the Cabinet.

Questions and answers were exchanged between OKADA and ABE over the question of the Navy. Finally the following decision was made and the meeting adjourned.

Accordingly, I asked him /T.N. OKADA/ if I might understand by the above talk that I have been given information concerning the gathering of the senior statesmen, that is, if I might take it that he had come with the intention of keeping contact, and as he replied in the affirmative, I acknowledged that such was the case. I asked him because I thought that I should have to give careful consideration, if he intended to ask me to report it to the Emperor.

"In order to find our way through the current difficult situation, it is necessary to renew the popular mind. All people must rally and cooperate to build a powerful national Cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."



At 12.20 on 17 July, 1944, Premier TOJO called and explained the Cabinet policy which may be summed up as follows:

"As we are told of the Emperor's intention regarding the three points to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal called attention some time ago, we have decided to carry out the consolidation of the Supreme Command as well as a change of Navy Ministers. I had a talk with the candidate for Navy Minister, Admiral Naokuni NOMURA, tonight, and we agreed."

"When we decided our policy at first, we were not thinking of the question of the Supreme Command. But things have reached a point where this has had to be taken into consideration because of the general situation, since it was feared that a state might arise in which there would be insufficient unity between Army and Navy. From this point of view, we have changed our policy on reorganization of Cabinet and other problems to minimum."

"Reinforcement of Headquarters. The Liaison Conference which has been inclined to be businesslike and has not been made use of to the fullest extent, shall be renovated and strengthened. It shall consist of two ministers of state of the Premier class (ABE and YONAI considered) besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of War and Navy, Munitions, Finance and the Foreign Minister."

Cabinet reorganization.

"In order to strengthen the air force, FUJIWARA shall serve full time as Minister of Munitions, and, therefore, we request retirement of Mr. KISFI as Minister of State. MAEDA or SHIMADA shall be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet. General ABE and Admiral YONAI will be asked to join the Cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters."

In connection with the Senior Statesmen:

"We are prepared to consider the revival of the Cabinet Advisory system, if it is desired by the Senior Statesmen. Hereafter, the Cabinet members shall always keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen and fully reflect their intentions."

In connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance  
Political Society:

"The advisory set-up shall be divided into two  
departments, technical and political, and five advisors  
shall be appointed from among the members of the House  
of Peers and the House of Representatives."



as well as among neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided by all means.

After asking the Emperor to summon the Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew.

I was summoned and was received in audience from 10:10 to 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression that judging from the line-up at the installation ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation.

It was past eleven when I returned home and at last had dinner.

\* \* \*

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 31 July 41"

.....From 10:15 a.m. to 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor, and His Majesty was pleased to inform me about the report of Admiral NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff, in reply to The Imperial question regarding our policy toward the U.S.A. as follows:

1. His opinion regarding war was the same as that of the former Chief of Naval General Staff, Prince FUSHIMI, in that we should try to avert war as much as possible.

2. He seemed very strongly opposed to the Tri-Partite Alliance. He also seemed to be of the opinion that so long as such an alliance existed, the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations would be impossible.

3. Suppose the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Japan were impossible and we were cut off from supplies of oil, our oil stored up would run out in two years. In case a war with the U.S.A. breaks out the supply of oil would be only sufficient for one and a half years. Under these circumstances, there would be no other alternative but to take the initiative in operations against them.

4. According to the written report submitted, the Emperor believed that we would win, since it is so stated there. When NAGANO was asked if it would be possible to win a sweeping victory as in the Russo-Japanese War, he replied to the Emperor that it was even doubtful whether or not we would ever win, to say nothing of a great victory as in the Russo-Japanese War.

5. I was filled with trepidation by the Imperial anxiety about the danger of having to wage a desperate war.

My answer to the Imperial speech was as follows:

1. Admiral NAGANO's opinion was too simple.

2. The U.S.A. recognized the existence of the Tri-Partite Pact in our previous parley with America, and I was very doubtful whether we could deepen the confidence of the U.S.A. for us by the act of annulment of the Pact, as the U.S.A. was a nation which showed respect for international treaties. We would only be held in contempt by the U.S.A. We were not quite without means of restoring the friendship between America and Japan. We must deliberate on the matter in a constructive manner. I would demand the Premier's careful consideration on this point. I met Navy Minister OIKAWA at noon to talk over Admiral NAGANO's report to the Throne. The Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor visited me at 1 p.m. to talk with me on the same subject.



Doc. No. 1632W(113)

Page

Entry for 18 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

18 July 1944. (Clear).

Hottest weather of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets.

At 8 A.M. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me. Received report on the circumstances of the Senior Statesmen's Conference at HIRANUMA's house.

Mr. Hisatada HIROSE came and talked to me about the pressing situation.

Went to the office at 9 A.M.

Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30. Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the Senior Statesmen, principally about their meeting at HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOJO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience. Saw him and talked with him in the First Anteroom. The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in order to carry out the political change smoothly, in view of the importance of the Army's position in the domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for my own information, of the succeeding Prime Minister, if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the Senior Statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the present political change; therefore, he supposed that they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed by an Imperial prince were considered, he hoped that none of the Army royalty would be taken into consideration.

Received in audience from 10:05 A.M. to 10:25. Reported among other things to the Emperor about the Senior Statesmen's Conference, to be held following the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.

Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40, and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the other cabinet members.

TSURUKO was preparing lunch at the official residence so I went there at noon with Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA. Mrs. Keiko SOMA came with her daughter Hisako and they had lunch with us.

Went to work at 1:30. In response to a summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me

if HIRANUMA intended to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not.

Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

The Details of the Senior Statesmen's Conference

Having been summoned by the Emperor former Prime Ministers WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE, HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in conference, at 4 P.M. on 18 July Showa /1944/. Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO having tendered his resignation. The conference was closed at 8:45 P.

Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE, who attended the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish, notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

The members then went into a discussion. First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as follows:

(1) At about 5:30 A.M. of the 13th Secretary AKAMATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me. He, however, did not come, tho I do not know the reason.

(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA called and urged me to join the Cabinet. Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a different matter if, for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme War Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA saying, "After deep consideration I have decided to reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

(3) A little past 9 P.M. on the 17th, SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau called on me. Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to make me change my mind.

Then the discussion began, the important questions and answers being as follows:

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion, Mr. KIDO?



KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good idea to consider the matter along the lines of the agreement made at the meeting at BARON HIRANUMA's residence?

HARA: What meeting was that?

WAKATSUKI: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion occurred at the time concerning a new Cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to expedite the discussion. As a split between the civil government and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think a military man on the active list will be suitable at this time. And as the Navy plays the most important role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take up the premiership? For this reason, what do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himself to the particular field of strategy and command, and it is most proper that the civil officials handle political affairs. It is unwise to appoint now from the Army and now from the Navy, like GENJI and HEIKE.

ABE: That's not my idea.

YONAI: If there is no ~~that~~ suitable man among the civil officials, it will be better ~~than~~ an Army man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the position for a month, and judging from my past experience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion I suggest this as a tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable during wartime. At present we must rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense. Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the premiership I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that some one from the Army take the post. A Premier should have political ability. In this sense, I think General UGAKI would be most competent though I do not know the latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but--.

ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is getting along.

YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the Military should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I believe that it is for this very reason that they are

strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable for politics.

WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without reason, but our country's practice is quite different from that of England and America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilian officials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking the matter practically ---- /original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selection.

YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.

HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The present situation is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabinet of influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial command will fall upon the five men here and they, choosing the premier from among themselves, will cooperate in administering state



affairs. Unless this /T.N. illegible/ no one can undertake it alone in this grave situation.

KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far, but I believe that the practical application would be very difficult.

WAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

HIROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. We must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the highest and most powerful organization. At this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new Cabinet? I feel that a good number of General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

Prince KONOYE: A Cabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present stage.

HIRANUMA: I, too, think it is not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

WAKATSUKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.

OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HARA: I think so too. One man cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not be a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I can well understand what you mean, but practically speaking what do you want to do?

HARA: The Cabinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANUMA: That is the very way I feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present stage, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cabinet is under direct Imperial rule.

WAKATSUKI: That is right.

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were to do it.

HARA: That will do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need further discussion.

ABE: In plain words then, it has been generally agreed that a military man is preferable. However, a man who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and retired military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.

HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national Cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.

HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

*KONO E. The same.*

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose some one from the Army.

ABE: That will not renew the people's morale.

WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that an Army man is best after all, having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.



HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the people, and the Army is on the unpopular side.

HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRANUMA: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew popular confidence.

HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is that the Army stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: There have been leftist thoughts among some men in the army for more than ten years. Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooperation of the Military, the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so. From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an army man is better.

WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on that point for some time.

HIRANUMA: So have I.

KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next premier must be some one popular among the Army.

WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the Army?

ABE: I do not know how popular he has been recently.

YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is popular?

ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There are a few others but they are all at the front and it will be difficult to call them back.

HIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any other Navy man?

YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal has said, it might be better to choose someone from the Army.

HIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince KONOYE.

KONOYE: There are some people who recommend Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

HIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons, I think it proper that he take the post for the sake of the state. I know him very well and think he is an honorable man.

YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of the nation's interest.

FIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

HIRANUMA: Though he is strong he is a man who can accept other people's opinions.

HIRA: I know him very well, too, after working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr. SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if commanded by His Majesty /T.N. to form a cabinet/ he would never accept it. I'm telling you this for reference.

OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an Army man is better.

FIROTA: I feel that we are in an important stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese system. Everybody should be present at Imperial Headquarters.

HIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

FIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the Army and the Navy are firm, that is enough.



KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one of them too.

WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General UMEZU.

Now about  
KIDO: /Marshal HATA?

KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary condition that he make a change in the Army so as to renew the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

HIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

KIDO: What is the comment at the front about Mr. UGAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointment causes discontent and unrest among the soldiers at the front.

ABE: Is the idea of a Navy man in the minority?

ABE: If an army man is preferred, the next question is who?

KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HATA?

ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2) UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should be considered.

HIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

KONOYE: There is also Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKI?

HIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

KIDO: What other army generals are there besides those?

ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO, and then of course there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?

YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and courageous.

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but of smaller calibre?

ABE: Absolutely different.

KIDO: How does he get along with Army men of the active list?

ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a different sort of man from TOJO.

HIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a pious one.

KIDO: What are his ideas?

WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although I don't know him.

OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well. What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. HIRANUMA? He was a member of each of your cabinets.

HIROTA: No objection.

ABE: No objection.

OKADA: Now we must reexamine the question of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet. This is an extremely important time and, as we need not come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to study the matter fully.

KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and Ministers in the Imperial Palace like the conferences of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am now studying that matter.

OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires careful thought.

HIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial order /CHOKUREI NAIGAKU/ or a coalition cabinet of Army and Navy?

WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier in every cabinet.

KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. HARA's opinion in detail.

KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, HATA, KOISO, and a naval man.

HIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA, and a naval man.

YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA. By the way when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before, the Emperor asked for the reason.



Doc. No. 1632 W (113)

HIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

HIROTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YATA.

ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YATA.

OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that the former may support the latter.

WAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee, of course it would be very bad, but if the nominee himself wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this long discussion. I will submit your opinions in detail to the Throne.

- - -

The meeting being closed, I was immediately received in audience by the Emperor in his study from 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the conference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire of the Army High Command whether the appointment of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would affect the military operations as he is the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor replied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I was received in audience again. His Majesty told me as follows:

Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to appoint General KOISO.

1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single day.

2) To allow the domestic political situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale, and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 July 1944"

19 July, Wednesday. Fine.

At 2:30 A.M. Mr. SUZUKI, Teichi, at 8 Mr. ABE, Genki, and at 8:30 Mr. HIROSE visited me and each discussed the political situation.

At 10 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and consulted me about the Imperial message to the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

From 10:20 to 11:35 I was received in audience by His Majesty and reported on the political situation and on other matters.

At 1:00 Mr. KAYA visited me at my office and talked to me about the monetary policy towards China.

At 2 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and conferred with me regarding the Imperial message to Chief of Army General Staff TOJO.

At 3 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA came to my office and told me about the circumstances of the change of government.

At 4 Director of the Police Bureau MACHIMURA came to my office and informed me of the conditions of peace and order, etc.

At 6 Prince KONOYE called on me at my home and asked me what I thought about making the next cabinet a coalition cabinet of KOISO and YONAI for the purpose of forming a true national unity cabinet, adding that Baron HIRANUMA had also agreed. As I had been feeling the need of taking some steps to put up a united front, I agreed to the idea, and at 6:30 called in Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA and asked him to find out the views of other elder statesmen before tomorrow morning.

INOUE, Goro came and stayed for the night.

6171 #3



Q. #1281

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 4 April 1941

4 April Wednesday Rain

Alarm at 12:30 A.M. Air-raid from 1 to 4:30. The use of a rather large number of time bombs was the characteristic of this raid.

Went to the OBUNKO /T.N. Literally "Imperial Library" but it actually means underground rooms built for air-raid shelter/ at 1:10 to attend to my work. Came home at 5.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library from 10:55 to 11:25, and was told by His Majesty of what he told Koiso in regard to the MIU-Pin matter. I cannot understand the Premier's attitude, his lack of confidence in himself.

Visited the Chief-Aide-de-Camp in his room and told him of my intention in case of a political change to meet with the two Chiefs of Staff as well as with the two Ministers /T.N. War and Navy/ and asked him to exert his good offices for it.

At 2 o'clock, Premier KOISO came to the office and talked as per the separate sheet.

At 2:30, MACHIMURA, Governor of NIIGATA Prefecture came to the office for a talk.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library from 2:45 to 3:05, and reported to the Throne Premier KOISO's intention to resign from office.

Visited the Grand Chamberlain at 3:15 to discuss with him the question of the mass resignation of the cabinet.

At 3:30, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room and informed me of the details of his talk with the Premier regarding the MIU matter.

Came home at 5. NOBUO left for TOYAMA.

## /T.N. - Separate Sheet/

4 April 1945

At 2 P.M. Premier KOISO came to the office and talked to the following effect.

"/As I have previously discussed with you, I am of the opinion that, in the war situation of today the present organization and character of the government as the highest national organ are by no means, good. That is why, with the Emperor's permission, I was admitted to Imperial Headquarters. I have also given my opinion /T.N. there/ concerning the direction of the war but to little avail. From now on, we must have, at any cost, an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or cabinet which will direct the war. Toward the end of last month, therefore, I talked with YONAI and we discussed the matter from various standpoints. We could think of a reform, but whether we should have it or not was a matter of doubt as we have never known of a cabinet being strengthened by reform. In fact, I informed His Majesty of this question at the end of last month. I had also thought at that time of opening the second Greater East Asia Conference in the middle of the month. Also in view of the war situation in OKINAWA, I had been thinking of deciding on my step at about the end of the month. However, not only has the second Greater East Asia Conference come to be suspended (a meeting of Ambassadors is now under consideration in its place) but also it is likely that the war in OKINAWA may take several months more. Meanwhile it happens that in the Army Marshal SUGIYAMA and Marshal HATA have been decided upon to go out as Commanders-in-Chief in order to strengthen the defense structure. Accordingly, the Army is going to recommend General ANAMI to the Throne as War Minister and I hear that the Army wants to realize the above plan by about the 6th. Such being the case, it would not be fair to recognize this change now and then carryout the mass resignation at the end of the month."/ Therefore, KOISO upon consultation with Navy Minister YONAI today, has decided that a resignation en bloc is desired for the reasons given in the separate sheet.

Then I asked KOISO when he proposed to do this. He answered that if it suited the Emperor, he was thinking of having a special cabinet meeting today to gather the letters of resignation, but I suggested that he had better do so tomorrow morning as there would be no time for His Majesty to consider the question if it happened too suddenly. KOISO agreed with me.



Was received in audience at 2:45 and reported the matter to the Throne. I stated that this time the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would like to see the Ministers of the Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff prior to the Senior Statesmen's Conference, and received the Emperor's permission.

/T.F. Text of Koiso's reasons for resigning/

Since we are convinced that at this moment when the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent, with changes on both political and war fronts east and west, and when there should exist no discrimination between the battlefield and the home front or between the Supreme Command and the Civil Government a fundamental change should be made in the organization and character of the cabinet so that they may cope with the present situation and so that the cabinet, together with the whole nation with renewed resolution may be powerful enough to go straight forward for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the Throne. To this end we have decided to ask permission of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a resignation en bloc.



Q. #1282

Doc. No. 16327 (118)

Page 1

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 April 1945.

At 5:30 Welfare Minister AIKAWA called at my residence for an interview.

April 5 Thursday Clear

At 10:30 A.M. Prime Minister KOISO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to tender his resignation to the Throne.

From 10:45 to 10:55 I was received in audience by His Majesty and was shown Prime Minister KOISO's resignation.

At 11:00, Prime Minister KOISO called at my room to talk about the time of announcement and other matters. It was generally agreed to announce it at the 7:00 P.M. news broadcast.

As previously arranged with the Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, I conferred with the Chief of the General Staff UMEZU at 11:35, Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55, War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 and Chief of the Naval General Staff OIKAWA at 2:00, as described in the attached report. At 12:55 P.M. air raid alert warning was issued. From 2:55 to 3:15 I was received in audience by His Majesty in the library.

At 3:20 Admiral OKADA called at my room and conferred with me.

From 5:00 to 8:00, we borrowed the Reception Room to hold a meeting of JUSEIN /T.N. Senior Statesmen/. Baron WAKATSUKI joined us at 6:00 P.M. because his train was delayed.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Senior Statesmen were asked to affix their private seals.

At 8:30 I talked with President of the Privy Council SUZUKI.

From 8:45 to 9:15 I was received in audience by His Majesty (at the library) and reported in detail the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. The Imperial mandate was issued to Baron KANTARO SUZUKI. I replied that it would be considered in accordance with His Majesty's discretion.

At 10:00 the Imperial mandate was issued to Admiral SUZUKI. After being received in audience, he called at my room and conferred with me on various matters. Came back home at 11:30.

20.4.5 /T.N. - 5 April 1940<sup>5</sup>/

I asked Chief of the General Staff UMEZU to call on me at 11:30 A.M. The interview was as follows:

"Premier KOISO presented his resignation to the Throne today. The reason is that in view of the present war situation, the organization and characteristics of the cabinet must be altered to make it more powerful. In other words, it should be an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or a War Directing Cabinet. In this connection, from the Supreme Command's viewpoint, I would like to ask whether you desire to express any opinions. I would also like to ask you of your opinions concerning the forecast of the war, the collapse of Germany and the political aggression of the San Francisco Conference.

1. In regard to the forecast of war, the battle of OKINAWA is bitterly contested and although the forecast is not favorable, we must be determined to fight it out to its bitter end regardless of whether the enemy can be routed or not. If the morale of the people can be uplifted to display its total power, it is no doubt difficult but not impossible. In this connection, the army is steadily making preparations. I therefore earnestly hope that a cabinet will be formed which will be in conformity to this desire. One plan would be to adopt a war-time cabinet or minority cabinet which was adopted by various countries in the previous World War.

1. The Imperial Headquarters Cabinet and War Directing Cabinet are worth considering but it is difficult to link together the supreme command and state affairs.

1. Petroleum is the chief source of worry but there is enough to last several months. At present, permission has been granted to organize special corps to dig for oil in Japan proper. We desire to double the present production.

O.4.5 /T.N. Probably April 5th/

Interviewed Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55 A.M. In general, I asked him the same thing I inquired of Chief of the General Staff UMEZU. Conclusion was that although it is called a powerful cabinet, nothing in particular could be thought of. Since Navy Minister YONAI is one of the senior statesman /JUSHI/ I took this opportunity to ask his opinions regarding the succeeding premier. He approved of Admiral Kantaro SUZUKI.

Furthermore, regarding the successor to the Naval Minister, he confided to me that since Vice-Admiral Seibi INOUE would not accept by all means, he decided to recommend Admiral HASEGAWA.

Interviewed War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 P.M. In general, I said the same thing I inquired of the Chief of General Staff UMEZU.

The War Minister said that viewed from his own experience, the unification of supreme command and state affairs with one man holding concurrently several posts, it cannot, factually, produce results. It is impossible. The perspective of war is extremely difficult as seen from the shortages in material and the difficulties of transportation. It could be surmised that the U.S.S.R. may loudly make proposal for peace after she defeats Germany. I think it is necessary for us to make preparations beforehand with consideration to the effect whether the U.S.S.R. would attempt it independently or together with Britain and the U.S. at this opportune moment when the war situation is favourable (the OKINAWA Operation) or at an unfavourable moment when she may attempt it independently or in combination. UMEZU is the best qualified person for the succeeding Premier from the Army.

At 2:00 P.M., I had an interview with OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff. Questions I asked him were about the same as that asked of UMEZU, Chief of the Army General Staff.

OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff registered shock upon hearing of the resignation of the cabinet and so forth, and frankly stated that it was bad at such a critical time. Speaking about the future prospect of the war, he stated that up to about the MARIANA Line, although the difference in strength between our forces and that of the enemy was considerable, nevertheless, we fought a regular war. However, it was later continued under guerrilla warfare. That it was a big stake can also be said.



- As for the battle of OKINAWA, even if we could fortunately drive the enemies out, the battle would not thereby end.
- The war situation would become more serious whether the enemy launches another attack on OKINAWA or advance in another direction.

In regard to the maintenance of war strength, we are now waiting for the time to arrive, since an immature enforcement would contrarily produce disadvantageous results. In the future, it is my idea to have the surplus men of the navy sent to the factories and maintain the strength. A monthly production of 1200 airplanes and about 20 submarines will be maintained and effort shall be given to manifest the guerrilla power. Of course we cannot be optimistic but need not be so pessimistic. There is, however, one condition, that is, the backing by a firm cabinet which is trusted by the people.

Oil will keep till about June. Thereafter, we think of relying only on pine-root oil.

Hereafter, our worries are the breakdown of internal set up.

Although they talk of a cabinet formed solely by members of the Imperial General Headquarters, it will be quite difficult to conduct war and state affairs together. I think the present form of organization is the best one in carrying out the war.

The meeting of Senior Statesmen was held in the front Reception Room from 5:00 P.M. on 5 April 1945.

KONOYE, HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, HIROTA, KIDO, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, TOJO (Baron WAKATSUKI attended from 6 o'clock)

1. The Grand Chamberlain made formal address -- the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal explained the situation leading to the political change and after reading KOISO's resignation, passed it around.

• TOJO: The resignation states that both the state affairs and supreme command require revision. What is the meaning /of this statement/?

1. KIDO: There was no particular explanation given by Premier KOISO.

/ TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on April 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first.

1. OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the total power of the country. Such a problem as war or peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe we must first carefully study these problems before determining this question /peace or war/.

/L. 58/ / HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no way out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this sudden political change and it would have been desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers KOISO and YONAI but since the resignations have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered obliterated/ it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any preparation, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as their Excellencies have presented.

/ KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total resignation would occur but I heard thereafter that it was changed to the policy of reorganizing and both Field Marshals, SUGIYAMA and HATA, were to be transferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it became necessary to change the War Minister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinet, General ANAMI as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect reorganization now and then to execute a total resignation a little later on would be betraying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is meant by this.) So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and I, myself, am much perplexed.

1. OKADA: Before giving out names, how about discussing the total power concentration and powerful cabinet.

1. HIRANUMA: Formerly, the Premier was first of all decided, and that Premier was to recommend the ministers for the portfolio to the Throne. But, at this time, if the principal ministers are not decided, the cabinet will not become powerful. If we adhere to the conventional way on Army, Navy, Peace Preservation, etc., we shall reach no conclusion.

1. TOJO: If we decide the cabinet ministers, then, doesn't it mean that the Emperor is to bear the responsibilities after the cabinet formation?

1. HIRANUMA: It would not be right for the Emperor to give orders directly.

1. TOJO: Avoid having the good and bad of the cabinet formation falling back on the Emperor.

1. HIRANUMA: From the point of formalities, it is as you say, but what I meant to say was that how about deciding it after soliciting our opinions a little more.

1. HIROTA: We must win by any means. Although there are pessimistic views, in this current war, no country has so far been winning straight through from the start. All of them have been, one time or another, on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back again. The next cabinet should be one that would fight through to win the war. I think it was really an appropriate action of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal to have interviewed the leaders of the Army and Navy authorities, but don't you think that it is necessary to ascertain the intentions of the Army and Navy authorities, a little more?

1. KIDO: I did ask them considerably but there was no special opinions expressed.

1. HIRANUMA: Speaking outright, Mr. KOISO's cabinet formation was a failure. He should have consulted us a little more. The reorganization, if speaking candidly, was a failure. Speaking of formalities, it is as His Excellency TOJO said, but in actuality, he should have consulted us a little more without being apprehended by theories.



1. KIDO: As Mr. HIRANUMA says, it means that after the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes a recommendation to the Emperor, he must not interfere with the organization of the cabinet. It is very strange that if the organization of the cabinet is unsatisfactory, he will be held responsible. Therefore, I think that as a system it is poor. However, at the present time, there is no alternative, and therefore, we cannot help but be resigned to accept this system.

1. HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek more advice.

1. OKADA: Some people say that considerable surplus power still exists in our country and ask why we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Before annexing the total power of military officials, government officials, and civilians, unity among the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we study as to whether the procedure we have followed until today, is right or wrong.

1. HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in this room and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes an informal report to the Throne, a situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do as he pleases, I wonder.

1. KONOYE: Although you are right, the problem is in what form it should be carried out.

1. KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer unity among the leaders.

1. HIRANUMA: Setting aside discussions from the legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think it is better to have closer contact in the organization of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

1. OKADA: I agree.

1. SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons. I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever the occasion demanded, Prince SAIONJI sought the advices of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet-Admiral TOGO. After obtaining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MAKINO?

/ KIDO: Although you are right, the procedure today is different from that at the time of Prince SAIONJI /T.N. approximately 3 Jap. characters illegible/. At any rate, we cannot immediately request his participation, since we have decided on the matter, with the full consent of the Emperor, that we should . . . . /T.N. Several words illegible/ . . . . with those who had once carried out the general administration of our country under the complete confidence of his Majesty.

/ HIROTA: Unification in the upper-classes is indeed most necessary, and I think that it would be better to have such person as Count MAKINO participate. In the case the cabinet changes, will the Supreme War Guidance Council still continue? And speaking of the Premier attending the Imperial General Headquarters, was this permitted only to KOISO or that hereafter, the Prime Minister will always be able to attend it?

/ KIDO: At present there are opinions that since the Premier attends the Imperial General Headquarters, the Supreme War Guidance Council is unnecessary. This is a problem that should be considered in future. The next question is that although I do not know the details, I think that hereafter the Premier will be able to attend the Imperial General Headquarters.

/ TOJO: The Premier will attend as a participator in the war council, and will witness the manipulation of troops in national defense.

/ SUZUKI: Although I can understand the case of Count MAKINO by your explanation, I dare say that only when we include him the scope will not become obscure but that I think there is no other qualified person similar to Count MAKINO.

/ WAKATSUKI: I don't understand the purport of the resignation. It is a very queer resignation to explain the character of the forthcoming cabinet.

/ KONOE: Since the case was so sudden, I have no idea. I think that, in regard to the opinion of His Excellency TOJO, it cannot be decided at this stage when the Supreme Command is not represented here. At this meeting, as at the time of the last meeting, first of all now about gradually limiting the field /in choosing the Premier/, whether it must be from the military circles, and whether it will be from the Army or from the Navy.

/ TOJO: I do not mean to say that the Premiers should be decided at this meeting. I meant that it should be submitted as a material to His Majesty so that he can prepare himself.

/ WAKATSUKI: The purport of His Imperial summons was to have us choose the Premier for the succeeding cabinet, and I believe it is against His Imperial will to discuss on things which TOJO mentioned. To discuss whether we should fight the war to the last, or whether we should seek peace halfway is an out of way question. I think it goes too far.

/ SUZUKI: According to Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion, we must now fight this war to its bitter end. I think this problem must be settled first. Therefore, if the leader of the succeeding cabinet does not possess this will, I think he is unsuitable.

/ WAKATSUKI: I thought I was requested to state my opinion regarding this.

/ TOJO: It is not so. It is meant to be merely an assumption.

/ KIDO: Today when the situation is such that the homeland is about to be a battlefield, the actual national conditions give rise for grave concern. The public does not always cooperate earnestly with the measures taken by the government. A large number tend to be indifferent. Viewed from the food problem, production increase problem and peace preservation problem, the incoming cabinet must be one that will place confidence in the people. Of late, anti-militarism tendencies have appeared substantially and I think this also must be given careful attention.

/ HIRANUMA: The basic idea is that eminent subjects of the state should be held responsible to the Throne.

/ WAKATSUKI: Twenty years have already elapsed since I had once been a premier so I have no knowledge of the present men. I really sense deep trepidation in feeling incapable of fulfilling my duty. I am willing to take all responsibilities but in regards to this duty, I believe that I am most unsuitable. I request that the system itself also be given consideration.

If the opinions of Baron HIRANUMA should be adopted, (select principle cabinet members beforehand) nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will thoroughly restrict the activities of the premier.



I cannot express any opinion as to whether the purport of Premier KOISO's resignation could be carried out or not.

/ KONOYE: On the previous occasion, the matter of state affairs and supreme command was also the focus of our consideration. For this purpose, a military man was thought to be most appropriate and was decided after boiling down the issue. Would it not be better to use the same process?

/ WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, I was the one that suggested it but the purport of this resignation is different.

/ KIDO: This resignation is but an expression of Premier KOISO's opinion, and it does not necessarily mean that we should stick to this.

/ HIROTA: It is better to have either the War Minister or the Navy Minister be the chief of the new cabinet.

/ HIRANUMA: There are two phases of opinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the war. At this time we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocate who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the Premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cessation of hostilities. From the point of formalities, it is as what Mr. WAKATSUKI stated, but actually, they are inseparable.

In the manifestation of the whole national strength influential persons from the civilian populace must be employed.

/ KIDO: We must formulate a system whereby the people will follow us.

/ HIRANUMA: Viewed from the relations between state affairs and supreme command, do you mean that the Premier must be a soldier in active military service?

/ HIROTA: Afterall, difficult situations may arise if the Premier was not a soldier of the active military service, but that is not always necessary if he is authorized to present himself at the Imperial General Headquarters.

1. HIRANUMA: At the least, he must be in the first or second reserve.

2. SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese War we had Premier ITO. The Premier need not always be a soldier.

3. HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless, my assumption is that, if it is to be fought, it must be fought out.

4. OKADA: Through the conversations carried until now, it seems that the character of the Premier, in general, is distinctive.

5. KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who will fight it out.

6. HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI.

7. WAKATSUKI: Actually, it is inappropriate -- I fear that he might say something thoughtlessly. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory. If we propose peace now, it will evidently lead to unconditional surrender.

8. HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme command and state affairs, I think, we need a man from the Army or the Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

9. WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has been clarified but how about its application?

10. HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

11. KONOYE: A person that has had no connection hitherto should be recommended.

12. HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, as seen from the public and people.

13. WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was decided to be from the Army and although a certain person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion, Mr. OKADA?

1. OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but gathered here are men from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

2. WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal approve of this measure?

3. KIDO: Yes.

4. WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

5. KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you would state your unreserved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. SUZUKI?

6. SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto Senior Statesmen make an effort. We have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. The resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. After that, we all will try. How would it be if he tries first? I have heard that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HAMA also made this suggestion. A week before the former President /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimately heard him talk on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed. I suggest he accept by all means.

7. KONOYE: Then it differs from aforementioned fundamental principle.

8. HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a military man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should be one with no previous connections. With the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall we appoint him after consulting him? In the present situation, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without consulting him.

9. WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

10. HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.



2. WAKATSUKI: Do you mean to say that we shouldn't accept their private consent?

1. HIROTA: I didn't mean that we must not accept.

2. KIDO: I shall also give my opinion. As I had said previously, now that the Japanese soil is on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening of the government has become all the more necessary, and therefore an imposing and sedate cabinet which has the confidence of the people must be established. From this point, I think the opinion of His Excellency TOJO is plausible but, personally, I hope to have His Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion.

1. TOJO: At the present when our land is about to become a battlefield we must take special care, or else there is a fear that the Army may take an aloof standing. If the Army takes an aloof standing, the cabinet will collapse.

2. KIDO: At this time it will be most grave if the Army takes an aloof standing. Is there any omen or premonition of it?

1. TOJO: Can't say there is none.

2. KIDO: As I have said a little while ago, the anti-militaristic sentiments are quite strong and there are possibilities of having the people take an aloof standing.

2. OKADA: At this occasion when we are confronted with a grave situation, a national crisis, -- what do you mean by "taking an aloof standing" to a person who received the Imperial Command! Whose responsibility is the national defense? Are they not the Army and Navy?

1. TOJO: Because of that apprehension, I said to take care.

2. WAKATSUKI: If there is such apprehension now, it is a serious matter. I believe that in so far as the Japanese people is concerned, there isn't a bit of such a thing.

Meeting adjourned at 8:00 P.M.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Commander, USNR, Serial No. 11-35-72, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the transcriptions enumerated below, of such questions and answers, consisting of 39 interrogations in documentary form, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Yale Maxon  
Yale Maxon, Commander, USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25 day of October, 1946

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section.  
GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogations set out below, and that I transcribed the questions and answers contained therein, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Myrtle B. Mills  
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on

7 February 1946	(Document No. 2499)
8 February 1946	(Document No. 2500)
11 February 1946	(Document No. 2501)
13 February 1946	(Document No. 2502)
18 February 1946	(Document No. 2503)
19 February 1946	(Document No. 2504)
20 February 1946	(Document No. 2505)
21 February 1946	(Document No. 2506)
23 February 1946	(Document No. 2507)

1 March 1946	(Document No. 2508)
11 March 1946	(Document No. 2509)
12 March 1946	(Document No. 2510)
14 March 1946	(Document No. 2511)
15 March 1946	(Document No. 2512)
18 March 1946	(Document No. 2513)
25 March 1946	(Document No. 2514)
26 March 1946	(Document No. 2515)
16 January 1946	(Document No. 4152)
17 January 1946	(Document No. 4153)
18 January 1946	(Document No. 4154)
23 January 1946	(Document No. 4157)
24 January 1946	(Document No. 4158)
25 January 1946	(Document No. 4159)
28 January 1946	(Document No. 4160)
29 January 1946	(Document No. 4161)
30 January 1946	(Document No. 4162)
1 February 1946	(Document No. 4163)
4 February 1946	(Document No. 4164)
15 February 1946	(Document No. 4167)
5 March 1946	(Document No. 4173)
6 March 1946	(Document No. 4174)
7 March 1946	(Document No. 4175)
8 March 1946	(Document No. 4176)
13 March 1946	(Document No. 4177)
19 March 1946	(Document No. 4178)
20 March 1946	(Document No. 4179)
27 March 1946	(Document No. 4181)
28 March 1946	(Document No. 4182)
29 March 1946	(Document No. 4183)

personally appeared before me TOJO, Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO, Japan  
Place

October 25, 1946  
Date



1632EE

木戸侯日記ヨリ抄

昭和十六年／一九四一年／七月二日

1108

七月二日(水)曇

午前九時安藤京都府知事来訪面談

午前十一時ヨリ宮中ニ於テ御前會議催サレ独ソ南戰ニ伴フ新  
情勢ニ對應スル国策決定セラル

十二時三十分河田藏相来室汪政府ニ三億借款許容ニシテ説明  
アリタリ

一時近衛公来室面談松岡外相ノ真意ヲ捕捉スルニ苦ム等、  
話アリタリ

二時ヨリ三時十分迄拝謁御前會議模様等ニシテ承ル

三時三十分武官長ト宮中ニ大本營設置ト甚木山行幸ノ件ニシテ  
打合ス

三時半下園佐古来廳面談

七時半廣瀬久忠君来前面談